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WEST VIRGINIA AND THE UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE: AN OVERVIEW
Part I
EARL M. CURRY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Just as the decade of the sixties was the era of reform for
commercial law, the decade of the seventies is becoming the era
of probate reform. In August 1969, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the results of
seven years of study' in the Uniform Probate Code.2 That same
month the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
gave its approval to the new Uniform Code.3 The introduction of
the Uniform Probate Code provides a timely and much needed
vehicle for probate reform.
In recent years there has been considerable public criticism of
existing probate practices,4 and the Uniform Probate Code may
* B.S., West Virginia University 1955; M.B.A., University of Pittsburgh 1957;
J.D., West Virginia University 1964; LL.M., New York University 1968; Associate
Professor of Law, The University of Akron; Member of the West Virginia State Bar.
'Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70s, 2
CONN. L. REV. 453 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Welman].
2NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE (1969) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM PROBATE CODE].
3Uniform Probate Code, 55 A.B.A.J. 976 (1969).
Because of the increasing mobility of the population of the United States
and the obvious benefits to the public of standardized probate laws,
simplified probate procedures and uniform systems of death taxes, it
would seem desirable that every jurisdiction consider promptly the enact-
ment of legislation that will bring its laws and procedures into closer
conformity with those of other jurisdictions. Enactment of the Uniform
Probate Code would be a major and beneficial step toward this desirable
goal.
Statement of Principles Regarding Probate Practices and Expenses, 8 REAL PROP.,
PROBATE & TRUST J. 293, 299 (1973).
IN. DALEY, How TO AVOID PROBATE (1965); M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH
LAWYERS (1968); Bloom, At Last: A Way to Settle Estates Quickly, READER'S
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well be "an idea whose time has come." 5 Unlike most recent local
attempts to reform-which have generally ended in a modest
amount of tinkering with the existing probate system-none of
which addresses the major issues,' the Uniform Probate Code
meets problems head on. The fundamental issue is: Why should
probate administration, any more than any other area of our pri-
vate business dealings, be under the supervision of the courts in
the absence of an actual dispute? Certainly, no one would suggest
that contracts entered into by competent, consenting parties
should be under mandatory court supervision unless a dispute ar-
ises that the parties are unable to resolve. Is there any greater
policy reason to require this mandatory court supervision in the
probate of estates in the absence of disputes among the parties or
creditors?7 In England, for example, the majority of estates are
handled without a judicial proceeding after the grant of probate or
administration. "The personal representative simply collects the
assets, pays claims and expenses of administration, distributes the
residue to the persons entitled under the will or the intestate distri-
bution statutes and secures discharges from the distributees."
DIGEST, Sept., 1972, at 193; Bloom, Time to Clean Up Our Probate Courts, RsADER'S
DIGEST, Jan., 1970, at 112; Bloom, The Mess in Our Probate Courts, RvADER's
DIGEST, Oct., 1966, at 102; Taylor, You Can Avoid the Probate Trap, READER'S
DIGEST, June, 1970, at 93.
Srhe Uniform Probate Code has been enacted in full in five states; in Idaho
and Alaska the Code is presently in effect; Arizona's new code becomes effective in
January, 1974, followed by Colorado in July, 1974, and North Dakota in July, 1976.
Oregon and Wisconsin are in the process of revising their relatively new codes, both
of which are patterned after early drafts of the Code, bringing them into conformity
with the Official Text. Maryland's 1968 code was based on the Second Working
Draft of the Uniform Probate Code, and Maryland claims to be the first state to
have legislation modeled on the Uniform Code.
During 1973 the Uniform Code has been introduced in the the legislatures of Cali-
fornia, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey (selected sections), Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota,
Vermont, Washington and Wyoming. In addition, studies of the Code are being
made in Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, New York,
South Carolina, Tennessee (which has already adopted legislation embodying the
concepts of Article VI) and Texas. In all, legislators and bar associations in over
thirty states have either enacted or are officially considering the enactment of the
Uniform Probate Code. See 6 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE NOTES (Oct. 1967).
'Ohio's experience is all too typical. See 41 OHIO STATE BAR Ass'N REPORT 1313
(1968).
'See Wellman, supra note 1, at 459-63 for a description of the development of
mandatory supervision in the United States.
NW. FRATCHER, PROBATE CAN BE QUICK AND CHEAP: TRUSTS AND ESTATES IN
ENGLAND 52 (1968).
[Vol. 76
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Creditors are protected in that the personal representative who
fails to pay debts before distributing the estate is personally liable
to the creditors, even though he had no notice of their claims.9
Probate without notice is not uncommon in the United States.10
Many states, including West Virginia," provide for ex parte or
common form probate, where the will is admitted to probate with-
out notice being given to any party.'" Administration of the probate
estate without cumbersome procedures is uncommon, however.
The Uniform Code provides simple procedural alternatives to the
survivors of decedents that may be used when there is no dispute.
Also, the substantive rules have been revised to more closely carry
out the probable intent of both the testate and intestate dece-
dent.'3 The Code states as its underlying purposes: "(1) To simplify
and clarify the law .. .; (2) to discover and make effective the
intent of a decedent . . .; (3) to promote a speedy and effective
system for liquidating the estate . . .; (4) to facilitate use and
enforcement of certain trusts; (5) to make uniform the law
.. ."" Thus, the Code attempts to overcome the problems of
high cost and long delay that have become ingrained in most
states' probate bureaucracy. 5
The Uniform Probate Code focuses its attention on the "af-
fairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors,
capacitated persons . . . [by] consolidating and revising aspects
of the law relating to wills and intestacy and the administration
and distribution of estates ... ."", In the broadest sense, these
areas, generally referred to as "probate law," cover the administra-
tion of decedents' estates, guardianships, testamentary trusts, and
the substantive law of wills and intestate succession.'7
The Uniform Probate Code is too broad to treat in detail in a
1Id. at 55.
"Simes, The Function of Will Contests, 44 MICH. L. REv. 503, 516-24 (1946).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-5-10 (1966).
"Riley, A Critical Study of the Probate System in West Virginia, 67 W. VA. L.
REv. 22, 31 (1964).
"M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES, & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHErrACE (1970)
[hereinafter cited as SUSSMAN]; Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of
Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241 (1963).
"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b).
'"Wellman, supra note 1, at 463-74.
"Preamble to UNIFom PROBATE CODE.
"Curry, Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of Article II
of The Uniform Probate Code And The Law of Ohio, 34 OHIO ST. L. J. 114, 115
(1973).
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single article. The approach of this discussion will be to identify
the major topics covered by the Code and the changes they would
make in present West Virginia law, and to interject the reasoning
and purpose of the draftsmen in relation to each topic. It is hoped
this discussion will facilitate a more detailed examination of the
Uniform Probate Code by the West Virginia bar and legislature.
If a legislative study commission is forthcoming to give considera-
tion to the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code in West Virginia,
the author hopes this discussion will be of benefit.
ARTICLE I: GENERAL PROVISIONS, DEFINITIONS,"8 AND PROBATE COURT
JURISDICTION
The Code contains a general fraud section,' 9 designed as a
supplemental provision to the other protections provided through-
out the Code, which provides a remedy that can be asserted out-
side the estate settlement process. 0 This would make a significant
change in present West Virginia law, since it is well settled in this
State that a will can only be impeached within the statutory two
year limitation,2 ' and that statute is jurisdictional, with limita-
tions upon both the right and the remedy even in cases of fraud.22
Thus, if a will which has been probated is later discovered to be a
forgery, and the forgery is not discovered until after the running
of the two year period now provided by the West Virginia statute,"
the defrauded heirs would have a remedy under the Uniform Code
and could bring an action for fraud under this section. 21 Bona fide
purchasers for value are protected under this section, but any per-
son who benefited from the fraud, including innocent beneficiaries
if the fraud was perpetrated within five years of the time of the
action, are not protected. 5 There is no time limit against the
wrongdoer (other than a two year limitation from the discovery of
the fraud within which period any action must be commenced),
but the drafters of the Code felt that there should be some time
after which innocent persons cannot be deprived of the property."
"General definitions under UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201 will be discussed
in conjunction with the substantive provisions of the Code to which they relate.
"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-106.
2Id. § 1-106, Comment.
21W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-5-11 (1966).
2Weese v. Weese, 134 W. Va. 233, 58 S.E.2d 801 (1950).
2W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-5-11 (1966).
2'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-106, Comment.
21Id. § 1-106.
"Relief against the innocent heir or devisee has not always been available.
[Vol. 76
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The Uniform Probate Code adopts the rules of evidence of the
courts of general jurisdiction of the State, unless modified by its
more specific provisions? The same evidentiary weight is given to
death certificates28 as under present West Virginia law, 2 and this
is extended to other governmental records as well." Under the
Uniform Code an unexplained absence of five years raises a pre-
sumption of death,3 1 while the present West Virginia law requires
a seven year absence.
32
Historically, probate jurisdiction has been statutorily vested
in courts of either limited or general jurisdiction.3 3 Under the Uni-
form Code, probate jurisdiction is placed in a court equal in stature
to a court of general jurisdiction,3 4 and appeals from the probate
court rise to the same court that hears appeals from courts of
general jurisdiction. 5 Of course, article VIII, § 24 of the West Vir-
ginia constitution places jurisdiction in all matters of probate in
the county courts of the various counties, with appeals rising de
novo to the respective circuit courts. As they are presently consti-
tuted, the county courts are primarily administrative as opposed
to judicial bodies, seldom equipped to hear and determine matters
of a judicial nature. Since the probate jurisdiction of the county
courts enjoys constitutional status, it may only be removed
through the amendment process. The necessity of such action may
prove to be a serious impediment to the enactment of the Uniform
Probate Code in West Virginia.
The Code provides for a jury trial, if demanded, in formal
testacy proceedings and in any other proceeding where a jury trial
is a constitutional right,36 protections which are also found under
Lowe Foundation v. Northern Trust Co., 342 fll. App. 379, 96 N.E.2d 831 (1951);
Dye v. Parker, 108 Kan. 304, 194 P. 640 (1921); Note, 5 MNN. L. REv. 488 (1921).
Contra, Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 211 S.W.2d 559 (1948); RESTATEMENT OF
REsTITTION § 184, comment j at 752 (1937). See also T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF WILLS § 57 (2d ed. 1953).
2UNIFORPS PROBATE CODE § 1-107.
2Id. § 1-107(1).
2W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-27 (1972).
aUNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-107(2).
1Id. § 1-107(3).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-9-1 (1966).
33J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD, & R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 281
(4th ed. 1971); Riley, A Critical Study of the Probate System in West Virginia, 67
W. VA. L. REv. 116, 117-25 (1965).
32Wellman, supra note 1, at 477.
2UNFORNM PROBATE CODE §§ 1-302, -308, 3-105, 5-204, -304, -402, 7-204.
-Id. § 1-306.
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existing West Virginia law. 7 In addition, the Code includes a no-
tice system whereby persons not formally before the court may be
bound by it,8 e.g., where an order binding upon a fiduciary will
bind the person in whose behalf he acts. 9 This doctrine-virtual
representation-is used to bind the unborn or unascertained where
his interest is represented by one having a substantially identical
interest in the proceeding." In addition, a guardian ad litem may,
at the discretion of the court, be appointed to represent interests
that otherwise would be inadequately represented." These provi-
sions are consistent with West Virginia case law, 2 but codification
of the rules is desirable.
ARTICLE I: INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND WILLS
Part 1. Intestate Succession.
Through its intestate succession provisions, the Uniform Pro-
bate Code attempts to reflect the wishes of the owner of property
as to its disposition at his death. In order to make this determina-
tion, the drafters of the Code used prevailing will patterns to deter-
mine what the property owner who fails to execute a will would
probably have done.13 This determination required the identifica-
tion of the major characteristics of those who died intestate and
an examination of the wills of persons who died testate possessing
the same characteristics. From this analysis the drafters were able
to determine the probable intent of persons who died intestate."
The purpose of establishing a pattern of distribution, as developed
by the drafters of the Code, was to provide a suitable distribution
for those persons of modest means who rely upon the distribution
scheme provided by .law.45
rW. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-5-8 (1966).
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-403(2), which applies as long as there is no con-
flict of interest between those before the court and those virtually represented.
3'Id. § 1-403(2)(ii).
'OId. § 1-403(2)(iii).
"Id. § 1-403(4). West Virginia has a similar provision for probate in solemn
form. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-5-5 (1966).
"2Hansford v. Tate, 61 W. Va. 207, 56 S.E. 372 (1907).
'
3UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Article II, Part 1, General Comment.
"The drafters of the Code had available to them empirical studies in Illinois
and Ohio. See SussMAN supra note 13; Dunham, supra note 13; Wellman, Selected
Aspects of Uniform Probate Code, 3 REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUST J. 199, 204
(1968), for a discussion of the procedure used. See also Curry, supra note 17, at 116.
'5UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Article 11, Part 1, General Comment.
[Vol. 76
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This dispositive scheme provides a larger share for the surviv-
ing spouse than do the present West Virginia statutes," because
most persons with relatively modest estates would prefer that their
surviving spouse take the lion's share of their estate. 7 The Uniform
Probate Code gives the surviving spouse the entire estate when
there are neither issue nor parents of the decedent surviving. 8 This
would be consistent with present West Virginia law. 9 If, however,
there are either surviving parents, 0 or surviving issue who are also
issue of the surviving spouse,5' then the surviving spouse takes a
lump sum of the first $50,000 of the estate, plus one-half of the
balance. Of course, this provision will have the effect of giving the
surviving spouse the entire intestate estate in most cases.5 2 Under
the present West Virginia statutes there is no provision for the
surviving spouse to take a lump sum before the division of the
estate. The Uniform Code further provides for those cases when
there are issue of the decedent who are not also issue of the surviv-
ing spouse. In such a case, an equal division of the estate is made
between the surviving spouse and the issue without a lump sum
first going to the surviving spouse. 3 Following the modem trend,
the Uniform Code does not make the distinction existing in West
Virginia between real property and personalty, but treats both in
the same manner.
The Uniform Code also provides that the intestate share of
relatives other than the surviving spouse and issue be limited to
the grandparents of the decedent and their lineal descendents.
This is considerably different from present West Virginia law,
which allows remote collateral relatives to inherit ad infinitum. 5
"W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-1, 42-2-1 (1966).
"SussMAN, supra note 13; Dunham, supra note 13, at 260.
"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102(1).
'"W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-1, 42-2-1 (1966).
OUNIFORI PROBATE CODE § 2-102(2).
5'Id. § 2-102(3).
5 1n the Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio study, a five percent random
sample was taken of all estates closed by the probate court of that county between
November 9, 1964, and August 8, 1965. The median gross estate for testators in this
sample was $15,000; the median for intestate estates was $6,000. Net estates were
$12,000 and $3,000 for testate and intestate, respectively. The average net estate
for all decedents was $27,007; for testate decedents, $35,160; and for intestate
decedents, $6,694. The average gross estate for all decedents was $31,097; for testate
decedents, $41,218; for the intestate group, $8,599. SusSMAN, supra note 13, at 45-
76.
nUNIFORNI PROBATE CODE § 2-102(4).
'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-1(k)(1966).
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If, under the Uniform Probate Code, there are no grandparents or
lineal descendants of grandparents, the estate would escheat to the
state,55 while under the present West Virginia law the next of kin
are traced through the great-grandparents to the nearest lineal
ancestor or his descendants regardless of remoteness.
The limitation on inheritance by remote collateral relatives
found in the Uniform Code has considerable merit. In a mobile and
urban society, known family relationships rarely extend beyond
the grandparents and their descendants." Therefore, to allow more
remote relatives to inherit increases the administrative problems
of the probate court, for if the heirs are not readily accessible, a
time consuming and expensive search must be made for them with
no assurance of finding any or all of the rightful heirs. Typically,
in these cases, administrative expenses far outweigh the share
these distant heirs receive.17 Aldo, by allowing remote relatives to
inherit, the likelihood of a will contest is increased since any poten-
tial heir has standing to contest the will, thus increasing the risk
of delay and added expense in settling the estate.58
The Uniform Code provides that issue of an equal degree of
kinship to the decedent take equally while others take per stirpes.9
If the decedent were survived by three children, for example, each
would take a one-third share; if, however, one of these children had
predeceased the decedent, leaving in turn three children (grand-
children of the decedent), the two children who survive the dece-
dent would each receive their one-third as before and the three
children of the predeceased child would share their parent's one-
third, or each receive a one-ninth share. This would be in accord
with West Virginia law.6" The Uniform Code does vary from West
Virginia law with respect to its treatment of half-blood relatives.
Under the Uniform Probate Code, half-bloods are treated in the
same manner as wholebloods,"' while under present West Virginia
law half-blood relatives inherit only half the share of relatives of
the whole-blood. 2
'UNIFORMl PROBATE CODE § 2-105.
'SussMm, supra note 13, at 138-42.
7Id. at 140-41.
"O'Connell & Eftiand, Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analy-
sis of the Late of Arizona and the Uniform Probate Code, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 215
(1972).
"
9UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-103(1).
'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-3 (1966).
6 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-107.
..W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-2 (1966).
[Vol. 76
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The Uniform Probate Code requires that an heir survive a
decedent for 120 hours in order to share in his estate or to be
entitled to a homestead or exempt property allowance. 3 This pro-
vision is frequently found in wills today to allow for the common
disaster situation, when two or more members of the same family
are injured and die within a short time of each other." This provi-
sion is an extension of the rationale behind the Uniform Simulta-
neous Death Act,65 which is in effect in West Virginia." The Act
provides only a partial solution to the problem, however, since it
is effective only if there is no proof that the parties died other than
simultaneously.67 By requiring the heir to survive the decedent by
five days, the Uniform Code provision avoids multiple administra-
tion as well as reduces the likelihood that the property will pass
to someone not desired by the decedent. 8
With respect to adopted persons, the Uniform Probate Code
is in accord with present West Virginia law. The Uniform Code
provides that for purposes of inheritance by, through, or from a
person, an adopted child is treated as a child69 of the adopting
parents and not of the natural parents.70 The West Virginia provi-
sion is similar.7 Again, this treatment of adopted children repre-
sents the modern policy as reflected by recent statutes and court
decisions."
With respect to illegitimate children, both the West Virginia
statute 3 and the Uniform Probate Code74 provide that they may
inherit from and through their mother. Both statutes also provide
that the child is legitimatized by the marriage of the natural par-
ents,75 and this is so even though the marriage be void.76 Neither
"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-104.
"Id. § 2-104, Comment.
OId. Article II, Part 1, General Comment.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-5-1 to -10 (1966).
-Id. § 42-5-1.
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-104, Comment.
""Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child under this Code
by intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes
any person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild or any more remote
descendent. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(3).
7u!d. § 2-109(1).
71W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-5 (1966).
"UNIFORN PROBATE CODE, Article I, Part 1, General Comment.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-5 (1966).
"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(2).
"Id. § 2-109(2); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-6 (1966).
WUNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(2)(i); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-7 (1966).
9
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requires acknowledgement of the child by the father, which leaves
unresolved the situation when a man marries the mother of an
illegitimate and fails to acknowledge the child as his own, but his
wife claims that the child is his. The West Virginia solution does
not require recognition of the child by the father as an essential
element of the legitimation" but places the burden of proving that
the husband is the natural parent on the child. 8 The Uniform Code
is silent in this respect, but presumably the procedure for deter-
mining the identity of the natural father in such a case would be
the same.
The Uniform Probate Code provides a second alternative
method for establishing paternity that is not found in the West
Virginia statutes. Under the Uniform Code, the child may be legi-
timized without the marriage of the natural parents by an adjudi-
cation either before the death of the natural father or after his
death, if paternity can be established by clear and convincing
proof.79 If paternity is established under the adjudication proce-
dure, neither the father nor his relatives qualify to inherit from or
through the child unless the father has recognized the child as his
and has not refused to support it."' The purpose of this provision
is to encourage the natural father to acknowledge and support his
children; if he fails to do so, it seems inequitable to allow him to
share in the child's estate.8 '
West Virginia and the Uniform Probate Code both recognize
the common law doctrine of advancements, although there is con-
siderable difference in the coverage and detail of the two statutes.
Under the West Virginia statute, 2 the doctrine is applied in cases
of partial as well as complete intestacy,83 while the Uniform Code
does not apply the doctrine if there is only partial intestacy.8 Both
statutes apply the doctrine to a broader class of donees than do the
majority of states."' West Virginia applies it to "any descendant or
collateral relative," while the Uniform Code applies it to any
aW. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-6, Editor's note (1966).
7 Farley v. Farley, 136 W. Va. 598, 68 S.E.2d 353 (1951).
"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(2)(ii).
mId.
"O'Connell & Effland, supra note 58, at 221.
8W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-1 (1966).
aPayne v. Payne, 128 Va. 33, 104 S.E. 712 (1920).
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-110.
12T. ATKINSON, supra note 26, at 722. The majority of states apply the doctrine
of advancements to children or their descendents only and do not apply it to
collateral heirs.
[Vol. 76
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"heir." Under the Uniform Code an "heir" includes a surviving
spouse g who therefore, presumably, can be an advancee.Y The
results of this situation are not definitive under the West Virginia
provision.'
The Code also limits the application of the doctrine to those
cases where there is a contemporaneous writing by the decedent
stating that the gift is intended to be an advancement, or an ac-
knowledgement in writing by the donee heir stating that the gift
was intended as an advancement. The reason for this departure
from the traditional and majority view89 was the belief of the draf-
ters of the Uniform Code that the reason for the doctrine was no
longer present in our society. The doctrine was developed during
a time when there was comparatively little wealth and an inter
vivos gift of a substantial nature to one child was in all likelihood
intended by the parent to be made in anticipation of that child's
inheritance from the parent. Thus, a presumption arose to the
effect that when there was a substantial gift to a child, the parent
intended it to be made in anticipation of inheritance; in order to
bring about equality between the children, the advanced child had
to account for the gift before any additional participation in the
estate was allowed. Understandably, this reason is no longer felt
to be valid in our affluent society. Today, most inter vivos gifts are
intended to be absolute gifts as distinguished from advance-
ments,"0 or, alternatively, are a part of an assiduously prepared
estate plan.9' Since the original basis for the doctrine is no longer
"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(17).
"See MODEL PROBATE CODE § 29 (L. Simes ed. 1946); ATKiNsoN, supra note 26,
at 722.
"'It is not clear whether the doctrine is applied to a surviving spouse in West
Virginia. One West Virginia case, by way of dictum, seems to indicate it is not by
stating that where the puchase price of property is paid by the husband and the
conveyance is made to the wife, a presumption of a gift arises, while if a parent pays
the purchase price and the conveyance is made in the name of the child, a presump-
tion of an advancement arises, thus making a distinction between a gift to a spouse
or advancement to a child. Deck v. Tabler, 41 W. Va. 332, 23 S.E. 721 (1895).
However, in a note to this case in 56 Am. St. R. 837, 843, the editors state that the
case stands for the proposition that "Where a person making a purchase of land in
the name of another and paying the consideration himself is under a natural or
moral obligation to provide for the person in whose name the conveyance is taken,
no presumption of a resulting trust arises, but it will be regarded prima facie as an
advancement for the benefit of the nominal purchaser." (Emphasis added). See
also Wright, The Doctrine of Advancements, 63 W. VA. L. Rav. 229 (1961).
"See ATKiNSON, supra note 26, at 716 n.3.
-'Id. at 718.
"UNImORM PROBATE CODE § 2-110, Comment.
11
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valid there is little reason to follow it today other than from a
"blind imitation of the past."9 Accordingly, the Uniform Probate
Code has limited the advancement doctrine to those situations
where the donor's intent is actually shown either through a con-
temporaneous writing by the donor or an acknowledgement by the
donee. In requiring a writing, the Code has reduced many of the
uncertainties of proof by parol evidence that have always existed
in most determinations of whether or not an advancement was
intended.
An additional issue, the Code treatment of which differs from
present West Virginia law, is whether or not an advancement to a
predeceased child of an intestate is to be charged against the share
that the predeceased child's children will receive by representa-
tion. The West Virginia court has held that the children of the
predeceased child are barred to the same extent their parent would
be barred.9 3 The Uniform Probate Code has taken the opposite
position, holding that an advancement to the parent is not to be
taken into account in computing the share of the recipient's de-
scendants unless required by a written declaration of the dece-
dent or an acknowledgement by the predeceased recipient.
Analogous to the problems of representation in advancements
are those of debts owed to the decedent by persons who are also
his heirs. The weight of authority requires that the debt be de-
ducted from the heirs' share of the estate. Both West Virginia and
the Uniform Probate Code have adopted this common law doctrine
of equitable set-off.99 The Uniform Code also follows the majority
view9 in refusing to charge the debt against the intestate share of
anyone except the debtor. If the debtor does not survive the intes-
tate decedent, then the debt is not taken into account in comput-
ing the share of the debtor's representatives.9" The question has not
been directly decided by the West Virginia court, but it appears
2
"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past." 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920).
9'Coffman v. Coffman, 41 W. Va. 8, 23 S.E. 523 (1895). See also Neil v. Flynn
Lumber Co., 82 W. Va. 24, 95 S.E. 523 (1918); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 76 W. Va.
91, 85 S.E. 29 (1915).
'
4ATKINSON, supra note 26, at 787.
"
5In re Boggs' Estate, 135 W. Va. 288, 63 S.E.2d 497 (1951).
"ATKINSON. supra note 26, at 790.
'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-111.
[Vol. 76
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that West Virginia would take a contrary position and require the
representatives of the deceased child to account for the debt in
computing their share of the estate. 8
The Uniform Probate Code would make a major change in
present West Virginia law"' in that the common law estates of
dower and curtesy and their statutory counterparts are abol-
ished.1 10 The protection these estates were originally intended to
provide is better provided today by other provisions in the Uniform
Code.'"' The concept of dower and curtesy developed in an agrarian
society in which the principal form of wealth was land and the
main source of income was the rents and profits from land. Histori-
cally, dower provided the widow the support her deceased husband
had been obligated to provide during his lifetime. Curtesy allowed
the widower to continue the use of his wife's lands after her death
as he had enjoyed during her lifetime. Today, however, when so
large a portion of the decedent's wealth is likely to be in the form
of personal property rather than real estate, dower and curtesy no
longer make as adequate a provision for the surviving spouse as
was originally intended.' 2 For this reason, most states have en-
acted legislation allowing the surviving spouse either the addi-
tional or alternative right to elect to take a designated share of the
deceased spouse's estate.0 3 The most modern legislation has abol-
ished dower altogether and, in its place, provided a share of the
deceased spouse's estate which is secure to the surviving spouse
against testamentary disposition.'1
Part 2. Elective Share of Surviving Spouse.
Most states have preserved for the surviving spouse certain
rights in the property of the deceased spouse that cannot be de-
feated by testamentary transfers. The official comment to the Uni-
"In re Boggs' Estate, 135 W. Va. at 309, 63 S.E.2d at 510: "An indebtedness
against an estate, as distinguished from an advancement against the estate, is
decidedly different. An indebtedness must be paid in any event: an advancement
... embraces no obligation to repay the amount thereof." (Emphasis added).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1-1 to -20 (1966).
'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-113.
"'See notes 105 to 173 infra and accompanying text.
"'MODEL PROBATE CODE § 31, Comment (L. Simes ed. 1946).
" E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-3-1 (1966).
"'ATKINSON, supra note 26, at 107; Johnson, The Abolition of Dower in Virginia:
The Uniform Probate Code as an Alternative to Proposed Legislation, 7 U. RICH.
L. REv. 99 (1972); Lewis, It's Time to Abolish Dower and Curtesy in Virginia, 3 U.
RICH. L. REv. 299 (1969).
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form Probate Code states that Part 2 of Article II is ."designed to
protect a spouse of a decedent who was a domiciliary against dona-
tive transfers by will and will substitutes which would deprive the
survivor of a 'fair share' of the decedent's estate."''0 The drafters
of the Code recognized that Part 2 was likely to generate contro-
versy. ' They also recognized that many states still have statutes
that protect the surviving spouse by providing the power to elect
to take a given portion of the decedent's probate estate in lieu of
the provision provided in the will. However, these statutes provide
little protection against the various will substitutes that allow a
property owner to transfer ownership at his death without using a
will.07
To protect the property interests of a surviving spouse, some
states have applied a fraud test and held ineffective the inter vivos
transfer made after marriage if it was intended to deprive the
surviving spouse of his or her forced share. Perhaps more states
have rejected this test and have made the determination of
whether the transfer is valid or not on the basis of whether it was
real or illusory.' So long as the transfers are not found to be
"illusory,""'s' most states have held them valid, even though they
may have been made with the express purpose of defeating the
forced share of the surviving spouse."0 This issue does not seem to
have been decided by the West Virginia court. The Virginia courts,
however, are in accord with the "illusory" test."' In any case, the
present state of the law in this area is still unresolved. Courts have
been searching for a solution which will allow a property owner to
dispose of his property to others in good faith and at the same time
provide the surviving spouse some protection against inter vivos
transfers intended to defeat the right to the forced share."
'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Article II, Part 2, General Comment.
"os"Almost every feature of the system described herein is or may be controver-
sial." Id.
101Id.
"'ATKINSON, supra note 26, at 112.
"'Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
"'In re Montgomery's Estate, 2 Ill. App. 3d 821, 277 N.E.2d 739 (1972); Kempf
v. Kempf, 288 Minn. 244, 177 N.W.2d 40, aff'd 179 N.W.2d 715 (1970); In re
Center's Will, 61 N.Y. Misc. 2d. 193, 304 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1969); Heller v. Heller, 7
N.C. App. 120, 171 S.E.2d 335 (1969); Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 172 Ohio St.
489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (1961); Irvin v. Thompson, 464 P.2d 775 aff'd 500 P.2d 283 (Okla.
1972).
"'Freed v. Judith Realty & Farm Prods. Corp., 201 Va. 791, 113 S.E.2d 850
(1960); Hall v. Hall, 109 Va. 117, 63 S.E. 420 (1909).
"'ATKINSON, supra note 26, at 113-17.
[Vol. 76
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The Uniform Probate Code's approach to this problem, like
that of other modern legislative solutions,"3 is one of extending the
elective share of a surviving spouse to certain non-testamentary
transfers.I" The elective share under the Uniform Code is one-third
of the augmented estate if the decedent is domiciled within the
state;"' if not, then the elective share in property within the state
is determined by the law of the decedent's domicile.1 6 While the
amount of one-third is the same as the present West Virginia stat-
ute," ' the augmented estate includes both real and personal prop-
erty. Under the West Virginia statute, the surviving spouse re-
ceives at most a dower interest in real property and a one-third
interest in personalty.""
The augmented estate concept, from which the surviving
spouse receives a one-third share, consists of three elements: (1)
The net distributable estate;"9 to which is added (2) the value of
property gratuitously transferred to third persons during the mar-
riage by the decedent without the consent of the surviving spouse,
by a conveyance which is in effect a will substitute; 20 and (3)
"'N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 2105 (1972).
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202.
"Id. § 2-201(a).
"id. § 2-201(b).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-3-1 (1966).
"'Jacobs v. Jacobs, 100 W. Va. 585, 131 S.E. 449 (1926); Sperry v. Swiger, 54
W. Va. 283, 46 S.E. 125 (1903); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 30 W. Va. 599, 5 S.E.
139 (1888).
""[IT]he estate reduced by funeral and administration expenses, homestead
allowance, family allowances, and exemptions and enforceable claims ... "
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202.
Ito (i) any transfer under which the decedent retained at the time
of his death the possession or enjoyment of, or right to income from, the
property;
(ii) any transfer to the extent that the decedent retained at the time
of his death a power, either alone or in conjunction with any other person,
to revoke or to consume, invade or dispose of the principal for his own
benefit;
(iii) any transfer whereby property is held at the time of decedent's
death by decedent and another with right of survivorship;
(iv) any transfer made within two years of death of the decedent to
the extent that the aggregate transfers to any one donee in either of the
years exceed $3,000.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202(1). Only transfers made during marriage are in-
cluded. Thus, a decedent may provide for issue of a prior marriage by life insurance
or a revocable inter vivos trust without fear of these provisions being upset by a
15
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property owned by the surviving spouse that was derived from the
decedent.'2' As a condition of making an election the surviving
spouse must account for his or her property and prove the extent
that it was acquired from a source other than the decedent. ' 2 Note,
however, that the inclusion of this third element, i.e., the surviving
spouse's property derived from the decedent, operates to reduce
rather than increase the elective share of the surviving spouse. If,
for example, the decedent made a non-testamentary transfer or
non-probate arrangement for his spouse, the spouse must account
for that property before she or he can share any further in the
estate. This is consistent with the two-fold purpose of the aug-
mented estate concept: (1) Preventing the property owner from
making non-testamentary arrangements for the purpose of deliber-
ately defeating the surviving spouse's right to a forced share; and
(2) preventing the surviving spouse from electing a share of the
probate estate when the spouse has already received a "fair share"
of the total assets of the decedent.'1 Thus the augmented estate
concept is like a two-edged sword - it cuts both ways, first, to
prevent the unappreciative spouse from completely disinheriting
the surviving spouse, and secondly, to prevent an avaricious sur-
viving spouse from taking more than the "fair share" intended by
the decedent.
The drafters of the Uniform Code realized that the augmented
estate concept is relatively complex and they anticipate litigation
will be required, at least initially, in those cases where the elective
share right is asserted.' 4 The proposed system should not, how-
ever, complicate administration in the majority of cases, since the
surviving spouse, rather than the personal representative or the
court, has the responsibility of asserting an election 125 as well as
showing that she or he is entitled to receive more than they have
subsequent marriage. Id. § 2-202, Comment.
"'Including, but not limited to, beneficial interest in a trust, the exercise of a
power of appointment, life insurance proceeds, inter vivos gifts, value of amounts
payable after decedent's death under a pension or retirement plan, and joint ten-
ancy assets. Id. § 2-202(2). Life or accident insurance, joint annuities and pensions
payable to persons other than the surviving spouse are specifically exempted from
the augmented estate by subsection (2). This section also provides that transfers
may be excluded if made with the written consent or joinder of the surviving spouse.
Id. § 2-202(2). Federal Social Security benefits are also excluded. Id. § 2-202(2)(i).
'IId. § 2-202(2)(iii).
1'Id. § 2-202, Comment.
1Id.
"'Id. § 2-203.
[Vol. 76
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 2 [1974], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol76/iss2/3
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
already received.'26 Furthermore, the time limits under the Code
require that the election be made within six months after the
first'27 publication of notice to the creditors.' 28
Under the Uniform Code the surviving spouse's right to elec-
tion is freely releasable either prior to or after marriage, so long as
there is a "fair" disclosure by the other party. This release may
also include the spouse's rights to the homestead allowance, ex-
empt property and the family allowance. 29 This provision seems
to be in keeping with present West Virginia law, 30 since the West
Virginia courts have held that both antenuptiall' and postnup-
tial12 marriage settlements may be upheld to bar the surviving
spouse from further participation in the estate of the decedent or
in dower, as long as the intent to do so clearly appears or is implied
from the language of the settlement.'3
Part 3. Spouse and Children Unprovided for in Wills.
The Uniform Probate Code makes the same provision for the
unintentionally' 4 omitted spouse who married the testator after
the will was executed as it does for the pretermitted child. Both
shall receive the share they would have taken had the testator died
intestate. This provision appears appropriate considering the
Code's abolition of the doctrine of revocation of wills by subse-
quent marriage of the maker. The Code makes no special provision
for the spouse who was married to the testator prior to the execu-
tion of the will. In that case, the omitted spouse can only assert
the elective share rights. The purpose of this section is to reduce
'12 Id. § 2-202(2)(iii).
'Section 2-205(a) (line 4) should read, "within six months after the first publi-
cation of notice to creditors." This will be printed in future editions of the Code-by
West Publishing Co. 3 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE NoTEs 5 (Dec. 1972).
'2UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-205. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-3-1 (1966) allows
the surviving spouse eight months from the admission of the will to probate to
renounce.
'
2
'UNIFORMi PROBATE CODE § 2-204.
111W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-3-7 to -10, -15. (1966).
"'Williamson v. First Nat'l Bank, 111 W. Va. 720, 164 S.E. 777 (1932); Bramer
v. Bramer, 84 W. Va. 168, 99 S.E. 329 (1919).
'Chambers v. Pierce, 94 W. Va. 766, 120 S.E. 912 (1924).
mWelsh v. Welsh, 136 W. Va. 914, 69 S.E.2d 34 (1952).
1
"[If] it appears from the will that the omission was intentional or the testa-
tor provided for the spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the
transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by statements of the testator
or from the amount of the transfer or other evidence," then this provision shall not
apply. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-301(a).
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the number of instances in which a spouse will claim an elective
share'3 to those cases where the surviving spouse was married to
the decedent prior to the execution of the will. It should be noted
that the intestate share the surviving spouse would receive under
this section will be greater than the one-third taken under the
elective share.'36 This will, of course, encourage the use of this
section rather than the elective share.
Under present West Virginia law,'37 the share of the surviving
spouse is the same regardless of whether the share given is re-
nounced or no provision is made.'1 In both cases the surviving
spouse receives the share of the decedent's estate that he or she
would have taken if the decedent had died intestate leaving chil-
dren.
The Uniform Code provides protection for the pretermitted
child born or adopted after the execution of the will, unless: (1) It
appears from the will that the omission was intentional; (2) the
testator devised the bulk of his estate to the other parent of the
omitted child; or (3) the child is provided for by a non-
testamentary transfer intended to be in lieu of a provision in the
will. 139 If the omitted child qualifies under this provision, he re-
ceives the share of the estate he would have received had the testa-
tor died intestate. Under the current West Virginia statutes, the
pretermitted or posthumous child also takes the share of the estate
he would have been entitled to had the testator died intestate, 40
and this is true even though the testator left other children who
were alive at the time the will was executed and who were not
provided for in the will. Those children do not share in the estate,
since it is presumed that the testator omitted them intentionally.,4
Thus, the elder children of the testator who were in existence when
the will was executed would not share in the estate, while the
younger ones, born after the execution of the will, would share.
This is so even if the testator left the bulk or all of his estate to
his surviving spouse, the other parent of the pretermitted
child-the surviving parent must contribute to make up the share
1Id. § 2-301, Comment.
"'See Id. §§ 2-102, -201(a), -202.
"'I. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-3-1 (1966).
"'Renunciation is not necessary under the W. Va. statute where no provision
is made in the will for the surviving spouse. Id.
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-302(a).
"'W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 41-4-1, -2 (1966).
"'Ramsey v. Saunders, 114 W. Va. 590, 172 S.E. 798 (1934).
[Vol. 76
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of the omitted child. This would not be the case under the Uniform
Probate Code, where the omitted child is not allowed to share in
the estate if the bulk of the estate is devised to that child's par-
ent-decedent's surviving spouse. If, however, the testator makes
a non-testamentary transfer to a pretermitted child with the intent
that the settlement be in lieu of a testamentary provision, then this
settlement would preclude the child from any further share of the
parent's estate under the West Virginia statute.4 2 This is in line
with the West Virginia position that receipt by any child of a
decedent of an inter vivos portion (or advancement) of his parent's
estate as his full share precludes that child, his children, or their
grantees, from any further participation in the remainder of the
parent's estate.'
The West Virginia statute does not make it clear, as does the
Code, that after-adopted as well as after-born children are also
included. However, when the pretermitted child statute is read in
conjunction with the West Virginia adoption statute,"' it would
seem that adopted children should be treated the same as the
natural born children of the testator.4 5 The Code also provides for
that rare case in which the testator fails to provide for a child in
existence at the time the will was executed because he believes
that the child is dead. Such a mistakenly omitted child receives
an intestate share.'416 West Virginia currently makes no provision
for this situation.
Part 4. Exempt Property and Allowances.
The provisions of Part 4 are intended to protect the family of
the decedent from loss of family assets to creditors of the decedent
or from disinheritance by the decedent.'47 Under these provisions,
1"[Sluch after-born child . . . if not provided for by any settlement, and
neither provided for nor expressly excluded by the will, but only pretermitted, shall
succeed to such portion of the testator's estate as he would have been entitled to if
the testator had died intestate . W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-4-2 (1966) (emphasis
added).
" Neil v. Flynn Lumber Co., 82 W. Va. 24, 95 S.E. 523 (1918); Coffman v.
Coffman, 41 W. Va. 8, 23 S.E. 523 (1895).
"'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-5 (1966).
"'See 70 W. VA. L. REv. 132 (1967).
"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-302(a).
"'"This part describes certain rights and values to which a surviving spouse
and certain children of a deceased domiciliary are entitled in preference over unse-
cured creditors of the estate and persons to whom the estate may be devised by
will." UNFoAnI PROBATE CODE, Article II, Part 4, General Comment. See also Well-
man, supra note 1, at 478.
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the first $14,500" of the probate assets are preserved for the imme-
diate family' of the decedent against all unsecured creditors and
beneficiaries of the will. This figure represents the sum of the
Code's five thousand dollar homestead exemption, three thousand,
five hundred dollar personal property exemption, and six thousand
dollar family allowance. The Uniform Code limits these provisions
to the families of domiciliary decedents,'0 as do the West Virginia
statutes.'5 ' The Code provides for the homestead allowance in set
dollar terms, although distribution may be in property rather than
money.'52 The five thousand dollar figure was chosen because of the
desirability of having a certain level below which the administra-
tion of small estates may be foregone.' 3 The five thousand dollar
suggested figure is realistic in relation to present day property
values and corresponds to the five thousand dollar homestead ex-
emption recently added to the West Virginia constitution.'54 The
homestead allowance under the Uniform Code is exempt from all
debts of the decedent,'55 making it equally valuable whether the
family property is held free of debts, is subject to a mortgage or is
rental property. This would not be true under the present West
Virginia statute,'56 which provides that the homestead is subject to
purchase money debts, debts for permanent improvements and
taxes, as well as debts contracted before the declaration of the
homestead exemption was recorded. 57
The Uniform Code provides that any surviving spouse domi-
ciled within the state is entitled to the homestead exemption. The
"This figure assumes that the personal representative grants the surviving
spouse the full amount of the family allowance which may be given without ap-
proval of the court. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-404.
"'Surviving spouse or minor and dependent children for homestead allowance
under § 2-401; Surviving spouse or children for exempt property under § 2-402;
Surviving spouse and minor and dependent children for the family allowance under
§ 2-403.
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Article II, Part 4, General Comment.
'
5 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-8-1, 38-9-1 (1966).
...UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-906(a)(2).
153Id. § 2-401, Comment.
'SW. VA. CONST. art VI, § 48. This section of the constitution was recently
amended to increase the homestead exemption from $1000 to $5000 and the per-
sonal property exemption from $200 to $1000. At this writing, the West Virginia
Legislature has not acted to implement these new figures through statutory
changes. Presumably this will be done during the 1974 session of the Legislature.
155Except security interests on the property itself. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
§§ 3-803,-809,-814.
"'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-9-3 (1966).
'
5 Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 21 W. Va. 76 (1882); Speidel v. Schlosser, 13 W. Va.
686 (1879); Linsey v. McGannon, 9 W. Va. 154 (1876).
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West Virginia constitution makes it mandatory upon the legisla-
ture to provide a homestead exemption for three classes of persons:
(1) Husbands, (2) parents, or (3) infant children of deceased par-
ents.' 8 The right to declare a homestead exemption exists first in
the husband while the marital relation exists; second, in either
parent with whom the minor children reside in those cases where
the marital relation has ceased to exist; and, third, in the minor
children if both parents are dead.
The Uniform Code also provides an optional section for states
that have a constitutional homestead provision. This alternative
provision provides that "[t]he value of any constitutional right of
homestead in the family home received by a surviving spouse or
child shall be charged against that spouse or child's homestead
allowance to the extent that the family home is part of the dece-
dent's estate or would have been but for the homestead provision
of the constitution."'2 9 The purpose of the alternative provision is
to provide for those situations where the value of the spouse's
constitutional right of homestead is less than the value of the fam-
ily residence and only a termiable life interest is to be enjoyed in
common with minor children. 0 Since the West Virginia provision
neither limits the homestead interest to a life estate, nor sets an
upper limit on the amount of the exemption,' 6' this alternative
provision does not seem necessary for West Virginia.
Both the Code 2 and the West Virginia statute"' use a set
dollar figure for determining the exempt property allowance rather
than enumerating specific property. However, there is a great dis-
parity between the thirty-five hundred dollars provided by the
Uniform Code and the one thousand dollars provided in West Vir-
ginia. Under the Uniform Code, the exempt property provision is
available in those cases where the decedent is survived by only
adult children.'64 The West Virginia statutory provision limits this
right to the surviving spouse or minor children.' Under the Code,
the exempt property takes priority over other claims against the
estate except the homestead and family allowances and security
' sW. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 48.
'
5 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-401A.
'CId. § 2-401A, Comment.
"'In re White, 185 F. Supp. 609, 614 (N.D.W. Va. 1960).
'
8 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-402.
'W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-8-1, -10 (1966).
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-402, Comment.
'5W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-8-10 (1966).
21
Curry: West Virginia and the Uniform Probate Code: An Overview Part I
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1974
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
'interests in the property.'66 In addition to subjecting the exempt
property to security interests, the West Virginia provision also pro-
vides for tax liabilities on the exempt realty.'67
West Virginia has no family protection statute comparable to
the family allowance provision of the Uniform Code."6 8 Under the
Code, the surviving spouse and minor children, as well as children
the decedent was in fact supporting, are entitled to a reasonable
allowance, not to exceed six thousand dollars per year or five
hundred dollars per month.' 9 This allowance is taken from the
est ate for a period of no longer than one year while the estate is
being administered. The present West Virginia provisions for
dower' 70 would come closest to providing the kind of family protec-
tion intended by the family allowance provision of the Uniform
Code. In West Virginia the surviving spouse is entitled to the use
of the family residence without charge until dower is assigned, '71
and if there are also minor children the surviving spouse and mi-
nors have the right to occupy the family residence until the young-
est child reaches the age of twenty-one. 7 Additionally, the dece-
dent's family is entitled to consume certain commodities on hand
at the time of the decedent's death. 7 3
Part 5. Wills
The basic intent of Part 5 is to validate the will whenever
possible.' To this end, the formalities required in both the writing
and attesting of a will are strictly minimized. The Code has also
accommodated those testators who choose to prepare a will with-
out legal advice by expanding the types of writings that may be
effective as a will. Thus, holographic wills are authorized, 7 1 as well
as a broader application of the doctrine of incorporation by refer-
ence.'76
'mSee UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-803, -809,-814.
";W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-8-11 (1966).
'
68UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-403.
1691d. § 2-404. The size of the allowance is determined by the personal repre-
sentative. Allowances larger than the amount prescribed by this section must be
approved by the court.
'
70W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1-1, -10,-11,-12,-20 (1966).
"'Id. § 43-1-10; Amiss v. Hiteshew, 106 W. Va. 703, 147 S.E. 26 (1929).
'"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-1-11 (1966).
73Md. § 44-1-17.
'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Article II, Part 5, General Comment.
75Md. § 2-503.
"'Id. § 2-513.
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Both the West Virginia statutes'7 7 and the Uniform Probate
Code7 8 require the testator be of sound mind and eighteen years
of age to make a will. Both statutes also allow holographic wills."9
Under the Uniform Code only the signatures and material provi-
sions need be in the testator's handwriting, while the West Virginia
statute requires the will to be wholly in the handwriting of the
testator.' 0 Under the Uniform Code the witnesses must either wit-
ness the signing of the will, or an acknowledgment by the testator
to either his signature or to the instrument as his will.'8 ' This
differs from present West Virginia law which requires the testator
to acknowledge the will if the witnesses were not present at the
time the document was signed.'82 The Code would also relax the
present West Virginia requirement of the witnesses being present
at the same time when the testator either signs or acknowledges
his will and further that the witnesses be in each other's presence
when they subscribe their signatures to the will.'M Under the Uni-
form Code there is no requirement that the witnesses sign in the
presence of the testator or each other. '
Both West Virginia 8- and the Uniform Code' 6 provide proce-
dures for a self-proved will. Under both procedures an affidavit is
taken, before an officer authorized to administer oaths, stating the
facts that would be required of the witnesses to establish the will
in court by their testimony. 87 The West Virginia statute does not
permit the use of these affidavits in the case of a will contest.
'SW. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 41-1-1, -2 (1966).
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-501.
'"Id. § 2-503; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-3 (1966).
'While the point has never been decided in West Virginia, the Virginia courts
have held that "wholly" as used in the comparable Virginia statute is not used in
its "absolute, utter and rigidly uncompromising sense." Bell v. Timmins, 190 Va.
648, 58 S.E.2d 55 (1950). Thus it would seem that the Virginia courts would treat
a document as valid even though immaterial parts such as the date or introductory
wording were printed or typed. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-503,Comment.
"'UNIFOP PROBATE CODE § 2-502, Comment.
"'Rees, American Wills Statutes: I, 46 VA. L. REv. 613, 620 (1960).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-3 (1966).
'"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-502, Comment.
"'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-5-15 (1966).
'"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-504.
Specifically, the witnesses' affidavits must show that the testator signed and
executed the document as his last will and that he did so freely or directed another
to sign for him, that his execution was a free and voluntary act, that each witness,
in the presence and hearing of the testator, signed the will as witness, and that to
the best of their knowledge the testator was eighteen or more years old, of sound
mind and under no restraints or undue influence. See Id. § 2-504.
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Under the Uniform Code, the self-proved will may be contested,
except in regard to signature requirements, in the same manner as
a will not self-proved.'m
The Uniform Code provides that anyone who is generally com-
petent to be a witness may witness a will and that no will or
provision thereof is invalid because it was attested to by an inter-
ested witness.'89 Under this provision, interest no longer disquali-
fies a person to be a witness as it did at common law,'10 nor does it
require the forfeiture of the gift under the will, as was required
under the Statute of George IIIII and the Statute of Wills. 1 2 The
drafters of the Code recognized that a requirement of disinterested
witnesses would not reduce the incidence of fraud or undue influ-
ence as the requirement was originally intended. Instead, they
viewed the requirement as a trap for the unwary in the innocent
use of a beneficiary as a witness who now will no longer be penal-
ized by the loss of his interest.'9
3
The test of the competency of a witness to a will in West
Virginia, like the Uniform Code, is his competency to testify in
court.' 4 If, however, the witness or his or her spouse has any benefi-
cial interest under the will, then their interest is voided by present
West Virginia law in order to make them competent witnesses,
unless the witness is also an heir at law. If he is also an heir then
he will receive the lesser of the will benefits or the intestate share.'
The West Virginia statutes do provide, however, that creditors and
executors are not such interested parties as to make them incom-
petent to be witnesses.' 6
The Uniform Code provides a broad choice of law concerning
the validity of the execution of a will. 7 If the will is valid in the
state where it was executed, or the state where at the time of his
death the testator is domiciled, has a residence or is a national,
'8Id. § 2-504, Comment.
1'Id. § 2-505.
'2 J. WiGMORE, EvmEcE § 575 (3d ed. 1940).
1"25 Geo. 2, c.6, § 1 (1752).
1197 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26, § 15 (1837).
"
3UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-505, Comment.
"'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-1 (1966); Sperry v. Clark, 123 W. Va. 90, 13 S.E.2d
404 (1941); Coffman v. Hedrick, 32 W. Va. 119, 9 S.E. 65 (1889).
"'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-1 (1966). This statute is patterned after the English
Wills Act of 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c.26, § 15 (1837). See Rees, American Wills
Statutes: I, supra note 182, at 131.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 41-2-2,-3 (1966).
'"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-506.
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then it is valid in any state that has adopted the Uniform Code. If
this provision were now in effect in West Virginia it would operate
in the following manner: If the testator were domiciled in West
Virginia and executed a will in Pennsylvania, while on vacation
there, in such a manner that it would be valid under Pennsylvania
law but would not be valid under present West Virginia law, ' the
courts of West Virginia would nevertheless recognize the will as
valid so long as the law of Pennsylvania permitted execution in the
manner used.'99 West Virginia presently follows the conflict of laws
rule that the validity of a will is determined with regard to personal
property by the law of the testator's domicile, and with regard to
realty by the laws of the jurisdiction where the realty is located;
the law of the state in which the will was executed has no legal
significance or effect.20 This, of course, would be changed if the
Uniform Probate Code were adopted.
The provisions for revocation in the West Virginia law and the
Uniform Code are similiar, but with some variations. Under the
Uniform Code there is no provision for a writing executed with
statutory formality which does nothing but revoke the will, a provi-
sion found in the West Virginia statute.0 ' The Code does provide,
as does the West Virginia statute, for a will to be revoked in whole
or part by a subsequent will or codicil or by a physical act.20 2 The
drafters of the Code leave the determination to the courts of
whether a subsequent will, which has no express revocation clause,
will revoke a prior will either in whole or in part.0 2
The major difference between West Virginia law and the Uni-
form Code in the revocation area deals with other circumstances
that revoke the will. The West Virginia court has held that "im-
''For example, under Pennsylvania law there is no express requirement of
signing or subscription by the witnesses but only that the will be "proved by the
oaths or affirmations of two competent witnesses." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2504
(1972). Thus, a typewritten will signed only by the testator and not subscribed to
by the witnesses would be valid in Pennsylvania but would not presently be valid
in West Virginia.
'"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-506, Comment.
10In re Briggs' Estate, 148 W. Va. 294, 134 S.E.2d 737 (1964).
""'No will or codicil, or any part thereof, shall be revoked, unless under the
preceding section [§ 41-1-6], or by a subsequent will or codicil, or by some writing
declaring an intention to revoke the same, and executed in the manner in which a
will is required to be executed .... W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 (1966) (emphasis
added).
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-507.
2Id. § 2-507, Comment. See Poindexter v. Jones, 200 Va. 372, 106 S.E.2d 144
(1958); In re Wizenrith's Will, 133 W. Va. 267, 55 S.E.2d 897 (1949).
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plied revocation is precluded as a recognized principle by the ex-
press language of our applicable statute.""0 ' Other than the general
revocation statute previously discussed, the only other statutory
provision for revocation in West Virginia deals with marriage.
Under the West Virginia statute,2 05 marriage revokes the will unless
the will provides otherwise or unless it exercises a power of ap-
pointment, which would not, in default of the exercise, pass to the
appointee's estate. Under the Uniform Probate Code divorce or
annulment revokes any provision made in the will for the former
spouse unless the will provides otherwise. No other change in the
domestic circumstances of the testator will operate to revoke a
will. 26 Thus, the adoption of the Code would change West Virginia
law from revocation by marriage to revocation by divorce. The
purpose of revoking a will by a subsequent marriage is, of course,
to protect the surviving spouse.20 7 Under the Uniform Code this
protection is provided by the omitted spouse provision0" or the
elective share provision.0 0
The law concerning the revival of revoked wills may be in
some doubt in West Virginia. The- West Virginia statute on re-
vival21 is patterned after the English Statute of Wills,21' which
provides that a revoked will can only be revived by a reexecution
or by the publication of a codicil reviving it. Kentucky and Vir-
ginia also have similar provisions.212 While the point has not been
decided in West Virginia, Kentucky and Virginia have taken op-
posite positions on the moment of time at which revocation by a
subsequent instrument takes effect, and, thus, when revival be-
comes necessary.
Kentucky is committed to the view that revocation takes place
at the time of the execution of the revoking instrument, '2 1 3 which
is also the English view.2 ' Virginia is presently committed to the
2"Swann v. Swann, 131 W. Va. 555, 559, 48 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1948). See also,
69 W. VA. L. REv. 108 (1966); 67 W. VA. L. Rzv. 57 (1964).
GW. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-6 (1966).
... UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-508.
mId. § 2-508, Comment.
-id. § 2-301.
-11d. § 2-201.
'1W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-8 (1966).
117 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c.26, § 22 (1837).
'"Rees, American Wills Statutes: II, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 891 (1960).
"'Slaughters Adm'r v. Wyman, 228 Ky. 226, 14 S.W.2d 777 (1929).
2'Major & Mundy v. Williams & Iles, 7 Eng. Eccl. R. 453. See also ATKINSON,
supra note 26 at 477; Barnett, Revocation and Revival of Wills in Virginia, 1 RCH.
L. NOTES, 147, 151 (1960).
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view that revocation takes place at the time the revoking instru-
ment becomes effective, which is the death of the testator.2 1 5 The
difference between these two views involves a determination of
when the revival statute is applicable. Under the Kentucky view
the statute would be applicable anytime a subsequent will was
executed and contained an express revocation clause. If the subse-
quent will was later revoked, the former will would not be revived
without a reexecution of the former will or a codicil reviving it.
Under the Virginia view, this would not be necessary since the
subsequent will was ambulatory until the death of the testator,
and since it does not become effective, neither does the revocation
of the prior will. Thus, under the present Virginia view, revival
would not be necessary to make the former will effective" 6 since it
was never revoked. This question has not been before the West
Virginia court, and one can only speculate on the position it would
take. The Virginia court has generally been criticized for the posi-
tion it has taken.2 17 Adoption of the Uniform Probate Code would
resolve the issue in favor of the Kentucky position. Revocation of
the second will would not revive the first will unless it appeared
that it was the testator's intent to revive the first will or unless the
first will is republished. 21 8
The Uniform Probate Code has codified the doctrine of incor-
poration by reference,"9 a provision not found in the West Virginia
statutes. In what appears to be the only West Virginia case to
consider the question of incorporation, the court allowed the incor-
poration of certain deeds into the decedent's will for the purpose
of determining the intent of the testator in his dispositive
scheme.22 This case, along with the fact that the Virginia court has
clearly recognized the doctrine,22' leads to the conclusion that the
West Virginia court would adhere to it should the question be
21Timberlake v. State-Planters Bank, 201 Va. 950, 115 S.E.2d 39 (1960); Note,
10 KAN. L. REv. 106 (1961); 37 N.D.L. REv. 128 (1961); 18 WASH & LEE L. REv. 166
(1961); 63 W. VA. L. Rxv. 86 (1960).
2
'This view presumes that the former will was not revoked by a physical act
and was retained by the testator.21
'
TSee Barnett, Revocation and Revival of Wills in Virginia, 1 RICH. L. NOTES
147 (1960); Note, 67 W. VA. L. REv. 57 (1964).
"'UNIFOPNI PROBATE CODE § 2-509.
21Id. § 2-510. "Any writing in existence when a will is executed may be incor-
porated by reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes
the writing sufficiently to permit its identification."
1'Wible v. Ashcraft, 116 W. Va. 54, 178 S.E. 516 (1935).
"'Lawless v. Lawless, 187 Va. 511, 47 S.E.2d 413 (1948); Triplett's Ex'r v.
Triplett, 161 Va. 906, 172 S.E. 162 (1934).
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clearly presented. Both West Virginia and the Code have adopted
the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act.2 2
The Uniform Code also provides that a will may dispose of
property by reference to events that have independent legal signifi-
cance apart from their effect upon the will, whether the event
occurs before or after the execution of the will or the testator's
death.22 For example, a bequest "to those who shall take care of
me during my last days, whoever they may be,"' or "to all serv-
ants in my employ at the time of my death fifty dollars each
'2 2
would be valid under this doctrine, even though it requires looking
outside the will to determine the beneficiary referred to therein.
Furthermore, the fact that the testator is also involved in the fu-
ture act of selecting the property or person to receive the bequest
does not necessarily invalidate the gift. It has been held that a
bequest "to the woman I marry" or of "the automobile I own at
my death" is valid even though the testator is involved in the
nontestamentary act. The fact that these acts have significance
apart from their testamentary effect allows the reference to them
to be honored.2 26 While there are no West Virginia cases on point,
the Virginia cases referred to above indicate an acceptance of the
doctrine.
As a part of its "broader policy of effectuating a testator's
intent and of relaxing formalities of execution, ' 227 the Code allows
a testator to refer in his will to a separate written statement or list
which disposes of tangible personal property. The provision ex-
cludes money, evidence of indebtedness, documents of title, securi-
ties, and property used in trade or business. To be allowed as
evidence of the intended disposition, the document must either be
in the testator's handwriting or be signed by him, and it must
describe the property and the intended recipients. It is immaterial
that the document was prepared before or after the execution of
the will or that it was altered after its preparation. 228 A typical
situation where this provision would be most useful would be that
of allowing a testator to list both his personal effects and the per-
sons he desired to take these specific items without requiring him
2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-511; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-8 to -11 (1966).
2'2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-512.
"'Bosserman v. Burton, 137 Va. 502, 120 S.E. 261 (1923).
wGinter's Ex'rs v. Shelton, 102 Va. 185, 45 S.E. 892 (1903).
-' ATKINSON. supra note 26, § 81.
... UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-513, Comment.
2-Id. § 2-513.
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to reexecute his will where there is a change of mind as to the
disposition sought. This list may even be altered from time to time
as the testator desires. To do so, the testator would be required
only to write the changes in his own hand or to sign the instrument
making the changes. West Virginia has no comparable statutory
provision, and the Uniform Code would, therefore, change present
West Virginia law. The written list would not fit under the doctrine
of incorporation by reference, since the writing need not be in
existence at the time the will was executed, a requirement of the
doctrine,29 nor would the writing have independent legal signifi-
cance apart from the disposition of property under the will. 230
Part 6. Rules of Construction.
All of the rules of construction set forth in this part are in-
tended to be presumptions and will yield where a contrary intent
is expressed by the testator in the will.2' This, of course, is a
fundamental rule in the construction of wills: The intent of the
testator will control so long as it is not inconsistent with a rule of
law.232
As it does in the case of intestate succession,?3 the Uniform
Code provides that the devisee who does not survive the testator
by five days shall be treated as if he predeceased him.24 This
provision does not apply, however, if the will deals with simultane-
ous deaths or otherwise requires survival. 5 Although West Vir-
22See generally, ATKINsoN, supra note 26, § 80; 2 W. PAGE, WILS §§ 19.17-36
(3d ed. W. Bowe & D. Parker 1960); Dobie, Testamentary Incorporation by Refer-
ence, 3 Va. L. Rav. 583 (1916); Evans, Incorporation by Reference, Integration, and
Non-Testamentary Act, 25 COL. L. REv. 879 (1925); Evans, Nontestamentary Acts
and Incorporation by Reference, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 635 (1949); Malone,
Incorporation, by Reference, of an Extrinsic Document into a Holographic Will, 16
VA. L. REV. 571 (1930); Mechem, The Interpretation of Holographic Wills, 12
N.C.L. REv. 213, 225 (1934).
"See generally Atkinson, supra note 26, § 81; Evans, Incorporation by Refer-
ence, Integration, and Nontestamentary Act, supra note 229; Evans,
Nontestamentary Act and Incorporation by Reference, supra note 229.
2IUNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Article II, Part 6, General Comment; § 2-603.
n2Butler v. Rader, 187 S.E.2d 627 (W. Va. 1972); Guthrie v. First Huntington
Nat'l Bank, 184 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1971); Security Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Willim, 152 W. Va. 27, 158 S.E.2d 715 (1968); Mauzy v. Nelson, 147 W. Va. 764,
131 S.E.2d 389 (1963). See also, Brown, The Testator's Intent-Vague Meanings of
Clear Sounding Phrases, 69 W. VA. L. Rv. 133 (1967); 70 W. VA. L. REV. 442 (1968).
231See notes 63-68 supra and accompanying text.
2IUNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-601.
=Id.
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ginia has adopted the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act,"' it has
no provision comparable to this.
The Code allows a testator to select the law of the state that
he wishes to govern the interpretation of his will without regard to
the traditional27 determination of the location of the property.
238
West Virginia has followed the traditional rules that a will, as it
relates to the disposition of real property located in West Virginia,
is interpreted by West Virginia law, and as it relates to personal
property, is interpreted in accordance with the law of the testator's
domicile.?" Both the Code 240 and the West Virginia law " ' allow
after-acquired property to pass by the will unless, of course, a
contrary intent appears from the will.
22
The antilapse provisions of the two statutes differ signifi-
cantly. Under the Uniform Code, the application of the statute is
limited to relatives who are of no more remote degree of kinship
than grandparents or lineal descendants of grandparents.2 3 This is
consistent with the Code policy of eliminating remote relatives
from inheriting.244 The West Virginia provision saves the gift for
the issue of any devisee or legatee if those issue survive the testa-
tor, regardless of whether the devisee or legatee was related to the
testator. 5
Both statutes save the void gift, i.e., gifts made to persons who
were dead at the time the will was executed.2 40 Further, both stat-
utes apply to class gifts, the Uniform Code expressly and West
Virginia by implication. Neither specifically answers the question
of who takes the share of a class member who predeceases the
testator leaving no surviving issue, but it would appear that both
would allow the other members of the class to share equally in the
predeceased member's share.
22W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-5-1 to -10 (1966).
z"See H. GOODRICH, CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 166-67 (4th ed. 1964); R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 198 (1968); G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS 380 (3d ed. 1963).
2 ZUNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-602.
2'In re Estate of Briggs, 148 W. Va. 294, 134 S.E.2d 737 (1964).
21 0UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-604.
"'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-3-1 (1966).
212Jarvis v. Jarvis, 121 W. Va. 388, 3 S.E.2d 619 (1939); McComb v. McComb,
121 W. Va. 53, 200 S.E. 49 (1939); Dearing v. Selvey, 50 W. Va. 4, 40 S.E. 478 (1901).
2
..UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-605.
2111d. § 2-103.
215W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-3-3 (1966).
218ATKmNSON, supra note 26, at 781.
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Both statutes provide that if a gift under a will fails and is not
saved from lapse, the attempted gift becomes a part of the resi-
due, 2 7 If the residuary gift fails completely, the residue would pass
by intestacy. If the residuary is devised to two or more persons,
however, and the share of one fails for some reason, under the Code
that share passes to the other residuary devisees in proportion to
their interest in the residuary gift. 48 This provision allows the tak-
ers of a residuary class gift to share the portion a predeceased
member of the class would have taken. The same would hold true
under present West Virginia law. It should be noted that all rights
of survivorship have been abolished in West Virginia between devi-
sees and legatees to whom property is left jointly. There is no
instance, save where the surviving joint devisee or legatee is also
the sole heir at law of the testator, in which such a surviving
devisee or legatee would be allowed to take the whole estate de-
vised.241 Even in that situation, the taking would be by operation
of the statute and not by the nature of the estate devised.20
The Code recognized that changes in, and accessions to, secur-
ities that are specifically devised frequently cause litigation,2' and
in an attempt to reduce this litigation the Code has spelled out the
rights of the specific devisee.2 52 West Virginia does not have a com-
parable statutory provision.? The Code further provides for a lim-
2
.UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-606; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-3-4 (1966).
21'UNIFOIPI PROBATE CODE § 2-606(b).
211W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-3-3 (1966).
25Hoke v. Hoke, 12 W. Va. 427 (1878).
2"See generally, T. ATKINSON, supra note 26, at § 135.
'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-607.
(a) If the testator intended a specific devise of certain securities
rather than the equivalent value thereof, the specific devisee is entitled
only to:
(1) as much of the devised securities as is a part of the estate
at time of the testator's death;
(2) any additional or other securities of the same entity owned
by the testator by reason of action initiated by the entity excluding
any acquired by exercise of purchase options;
(3) securities of another entity owned by the testator as a
result of a merger, consolidation, reorganization or other similar
action initiated by the entity; and
(4) any additional securities of the entity owned by the testa-
tor as a result of a plan of reinvestment if it is a regulated invest-
ment company.
(b) Distributions prior to death with respect to a specifically devised
security not provided for in subsection (a) are not part of the specific
devise.
2See Cuppett v. Neilly, 143 W. Va. 845, 105 S.E.2d 548 (1958).
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ited nonademption if the specifically devised property is sold by a
conservator or if there is a condemnation award or fire or casualty
insurance proceeds in relation to the devised property are paid to
a conservator.254 Furthermore, the Code also provides for non-
ademption if the specifically devised property has been removed
from the testator's estate within a short time before his death.r 5
In each of these situations there has been such a material altera-
tion in the devised property that a majority of states, including
West Virginia,2 1 would hold the devise to be adeemed.
The Uniform Probate Code's provision eliminating the right
to exoneration of a specific devise27 reverses the common law rule"I
and adopts the contrary rule-specific devises pass subject to secu-
rity interests existing at the date of death, regardless of the will's
general directive to pay debts.25 While there are no West Virginia
statutes or cases on point, the West Virginia rule has long been
that the personal property of a decedent is the primary source for
the payment of debts of all classes. 20 The Virginia court has upheld
the doctrine of exoneration in cases where the will has expressly
directed the payment of debts from personal property,"' but it has
refused to do so where the manifest intention of the testator would
be defeated. 212 It seems likely that West Virginia would follow the
same course.
The Uniform Code adopts the rule that unless a will makes
specific reference to a power of appointment or some other indica-
tion of intent to exercise is shown, a general residuary clause or a
will making a general disposition of the testator's estate does not
exercise the power of appointment held by the testator. 213 This is
the opposite of the West Virginia statute, which provides that a
devise or bequest shall be construed to operate as an exercise of a
power of appointment unless a contrary intent appears in the will
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-608.
=Id. § 2-608(b)(i)(4).
2"Cuppett v. Neilly, 143 W. Va. 845, 105 S.E.2d 548 (1958); Swann v. Swann,
131 W. Va. 555, 48 S.E.2d 425 (1948); Dunn's Ex'rs v. Renick, 40 W. Va. 349, 22
S.E. 66 (1895).
2'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-609.
2 'See ATKINSON, supra note 26, at § 137.
Z'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-609, Comment.
2'W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-2-21,-22 (1973 Supp.); Bank of Mill Creek v. Elk
Horn Coal Corp., 136 W. Va. 36, 65 S.E.2d 892 (1951).
2
'French v. Vradenburg's Ex'rs, 105 Va. 16, 52 S.E. 695 (1906).
21Kellam's Ex'rs v. Jacob, 152 Va. 725, 148 S.E. 835 (1929).
2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-610.
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or unless the instrument which created the power of appointment
requires that the power must be specifically referred to and ex-
pressly exercised.6 The Commissioners set forth two reasons for
the Code rule: (1) It is the majority rule in this country; and (2)
most powers of appointment are created in marital deduction
trusts, and the donor would prefer to have the property pass under
his trust in the absence of a specific exercise of the power by the
donee." 5
In order to expedite the determination of persons to be in-
cluded in gifts to a class, the Uniform Code has adopted for wills
the rules applied under intestate succession for determining cer-
tain relationships.266 Oftentimes, when there is class gift terminol-
ogy in the will, questions of construction arise concerning the de-
termination of who is to be included within the class of persons to
whom the gift is made. These determinations have generated con-
siderable litigation in many states, including West Virginia, and
courts are divided on who should be included within the class.
Under the Code provision, for example, adopted children would be
included within a class gift "to the children of A." Under the
present West Virginia construction an adopted child would not be
included in a class gift to the children of the adoptive parent,
unless a contrary intent was disclosed by the will. 67 Further, an
illegitimate child may only be included in a gift to the mother's
children and not to the natural father's children.2 8 Also, if the class
contained both whole and half blood members, the half blood
members of the class would presumably take only half the share
taken by the full blood members of the class.2 9 The Uniform Code
would include adopted, illegitimate and half blooded children in
a class gift to an equal extent with the other children of the testa-
tor.
Concomitant with their differences in the application of the
intestate doctrine of advancements, n0 the Uniform Code and West
Virginia law also differ in the testate doctrine of satisfaction of
'"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-3-6 (1966).
2
'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-610, Comment.
211d. § 2-611. See notes 61-62, 69-81 supra and accompanying text.
' 'Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 151 W. Va. 429, 153 S.E.2d 114
(1967); Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va. 703, 37 S.E.2d
563 (1946). See also 70 W. VA. L. REv. 132 (1967).
2
"'Pace v. Celebrezze, 243 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.W. Va. 1965).
...W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-2 (1966); Billups v. Bartram, 96 W. Va. 601, 123
S.E. 442 (1924).
"See notes 82 to 93 supra and accompanying text.
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legacies. The Uniform Code provision27' follows the same poli.cy
approach taken in the advancement situation and abolishes- the
presumption of satisfaction by requiring written evidence of the
testator's intent to treat an inter vivos gift as a satisfaction of a
bequest under a will. 2 The West Virginia provision2" likewise par-
allels the West Virginia advancement doctrine and includes the
presumption that an inter vivos gift to the devisee shall be in
satisfaction of the bequest contained in a previously made will,
unless the presumption is rebutted by parole or other evidence.-
Part 7. Contractual Arrangements Relating to Death.
The Uniform Probate Code provides that a contract concern-
ing succession, either to make, revoke, or not to make a will, can
be established if the will either sets out the material provisions of
the contract, makes specific reference to the contract by extrinsic
evidence to prove its terms, or if there is a separate writing signed
by the decedent evidencing the contract. Furthermore, the execu-
tion of joint or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a
contract not to revoke. 25 The stated purpose of this section is "to
tighten the methods by which contracts concerning succession may
be proved."2 The Commissioners were concerned with the amount
of litigation resulting from oral contracts not to revoke and the use
of a presumption that the parties had contracted not to revoke
when joint wills were executed. "Oral testimony regarding the con-
tract is permitted if the will makes reference to the contract, but
this provision of the statute is not intended to affect normal rules
regarding admissibility of evidence."2
The adoption of this Code provision would reverse present
West Virginia law, under which it has long been settled that an
oral contract to make a will is valid and enforceable so long as it
is certain and definite in terms and based upon sufficient consider-
2'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-612.
2112d. § 2-612, Comment.
"'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-3-2 (1966).
21'Cf. Harrison's Ex'r v. Harrison's Adm'r, 171 Va. 224, 198 S.E. 902 (1938);
Garrett v. Andis, 159 Va. 150, 165 S.E. 657 (1932). These Virginia cases are con-
structions of an identical Virginia statutory provision. VA. CODE ANN. § 64-63
(1950); see W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-3-2, Editor's note (1966).
2"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-701.
2'Id. § 2-701, Comment.
2"Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the operation of the dead man's statute, see,
e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-1 (1966), should not be affected.
[Vol. 76
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ation. 5 Thus, the Code would preclude recovery by way of "quasi
specific performance ' 279 when the contract and the evidence of it
rest entirely in parole. The present West Virginia rule that part
performance by one of the parties to the oral contract removes it
from the Statute of Frauds 0 would be eliminated by the Uniform
Code's requirement of a writing. While joint or mutual wills are not
by themselves enough to establish a contract not to revoke under
current West Virginia law, the mutual bequests are evidence of a
contractual arrangement between the makers. 28 ' Furthermore, it
has been held not to be essential that the contract be established
by direct evidence. If the facts and circumstances are such as to
raise an implication that a contract was entered into, this will be
sufficient.1 2 Facts and circumstances that the court will consider
to determine whether a contract was intended include such things
as the fact the wills were written and executed at the same time,
that each testator knew the provisions of the other's will, that the
text of both wills was the same, and that the instructions and
discussions of the parties preparatory to drafting the instruments
were indicative of a prior understanding and agreement. 213 This
"contract by implication" in situations of a joint or mutual will
would no longer be valid under the Uniform Code.
Part 8. General Provisions.
The general comment to Part 8 states that the three provisions
contained therein cut across both testate and intestate succes-
sion.21 The first of these deals with the renunciation of succession
either under a will or at intestate succession.2 5 Both West Virginia
and the Uniform Code have eliminated the inconsistency of allow-
2"Mullins v. Green, 143 W. Va. 888, 105 S.E.2d 542 (1958); Lantz v. Reed, 141
W. Va. 204, 89 S.E.2d 612 (1955); Gray v. Marino, 138 W. Va. 585, 76 S.E.2d 585
(1953); Hedrick v. Harper, 135 W. Va. 47, 62 S.E.2d 265 (1950); Harris v. Harris,
130 W. Va. 100, 43 S.E.2d 225 (1947); Turner v. Theiss, 129 W. Va. 23, 38 S.E.2d
369 (1946); Jefferson v. Simpson, 83 W. Va. 274, 98 S.E. 212 (1919); Davidson v.
Davidson, 72 W. Va. 747, 79 S.E. 998 (1913).
2"Note, Oral Contracts To Devise and Bequeath in West Virginia, 58 W. Va.
L. Rev. 398 (1956).
2"Lantz v. Reed, 141 W. Va. 204, 89 S.E.2d 612 (1955).
2"'Turner v. Theiss, 129 W. Va. 23, 38 S.E.2d 369 (1946); Wilson v. Starback,
116 W. Va. 554, 182 S.E. 539 (1935); Underwood v. Myer, 107 W. Va. 57, 146 S.E.
896 (1929).
"Turner v. Theiss, 129 W. Va. 23, 38 S.E.2d 369 (1946).
2in re Reed's Estate, 125 W. Va. 555, 26 S.E.2d 222 (1943).
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Article II, Part 8, General Comment.
'Id. § 2-801.
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ing a devisee under a will to renounce his gift but not allowing the
heir-at-law to renounce his share at intestate succession. The West
Virginia statutory provision allows any competent adult to re-
nounce any interest in property he may receive by way of a will or
by the laws of descent and distribution. '6 Renounced property
passes as the will directs when there is a provision for renunciation
in the will, or, absent such provision, as if the renouncer had imme-
diately predeceased the testator in the case of a will, or in the case
of intestacy, as if the renouncer had predeceased the decedent. The
West Virginia statute requires, as does the Uniform Code, that the
renunciation be in writing, signed by the renouncer, and acknowl-
edged with the same degree of formality as would be required to
admit a deed to record."' Under the Uniform Code, renounced
property passes as if the renouncer failed to survive the decedent.,
Intestate property passes to the heir who would take if the renoun-
cer had predeceased the decedent and, for consistency, the same
rule is applied to the renunciation of a will.29 The Code allows the
devisee or heir to renounce his inheritance in whole or in part,
while the West Virginia statute is silent as to whether there can
be a partial renunciation. Furthermore, the presence of a spendth-
rift provision will not affect the right to renounce under the Code,20
which also provides that the right to renounce must be exercised
within six months after the decedent's death or after the taker is
ascertained.2 1' Under the West Virginia statute, renunciation
rights must be exercised within two months of the decedent's death
or the probate of the will, unless there is a will contest, in which
case the time period is extended to two months from the final
decision.292
Will provisions in favor of a spouse are revoked by a subse-
quent divorce or annulment under the Code, 293 but not under pres-
ent West Virginia law.294 The Code 9" has expanded this principle
to bar the surviving spouse in certain situations, as for example,
the invalid divorce or annulment. Under this provision all statu-
2"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-3 (1966).
2971d.
2
"UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(c).
191d. § 2-801, Comment.
2
"Id. § 2-801(e).
29Id. § 2-801(b).
"
2W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-3 (1966).
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-508.
"'See notes 204-09 supra and accompanying text.
29
'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-802.
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tory rights as well as will benefits are terminated if the required
definitive legal act is present."96 No person who obtains or consents
to a divorce or annulment, even though the decree is not valid, is
considered a surviving spouse unless the parties subsequently re-
marry or live together as man and wife.27 If the ex-spouse marries
another person following a divorce or annulment obtained by the
decedent, all benefits are also terminated.28 Finally, if the spouse
was a party to a valid proceeding in which all marital property
rights were terminated by court order, this will also estop all claims
of succession rights based on the marital relation.2 9 A legal separa-
tion, however, does not affect succession rights.30
Under the West Virginia statutes, divorce 0 ' or annulment' 2
bars the spouse's rights to dower, except in the case of a divorce
from bed and board, 3 which does not deprive the spouse of marital
property rights9 4 The West Virginia statute also provides that the
court, in a divorce or annulment case, has the power to restore to
each party his separate property." 5 Furthermore, the courts recog-
nize the right of divorcing spouses to enter into property settle-
ments that are approved by the court in connection with divorce
proceedings2 06 It would seem that if the property rights of the
parties are raised in such a proceeding, and the suit is disposed of
by an absolute divorce decree without settling the property rights,
then the property rights of the parties would be left in the same
state as they were at the time of the decree. On the other hand, if
the property rights are disposed of in the suit, then it would seem
that, as between the parties, the rights to marital property would
become res judicata by the divorce.3 7 Adoption of the Uniform
Probate Code would clarify this point in the West Virginia law.
The Uniform Code contains an optional provision which pre-
Paid. § 2-802, Comment.
-7Id. § 2-802(b)(1).
-'Id. § 2-802(b)(2).
2'Id. § 2-802(b)(3).
111Id. § 2-802(a); § 2-802, Comment.
"'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-20 (1973 Supp.).
-
2Id. § 48-2-19.
=Id. § 48-2-22.
'Perine v. Perine, 92 W. Va. 530, 114 S.E. 871 (1922); Kittle v. Kittle, 86 W.
Va. 46, 102 S.E. 799 (1920).
0W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-21 (1973 Supp.).
"State ex rel. Collins v. Muntzing, 151 W. Va. 843, 157 S.E.2d 16 (1967);
Farley v. Farley, 149 W. Va. 352, 141 S.E.2d 63 (1965).
-'Cf. 70 W. VA. L. REv. 271 (1968).
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cludes a person who feloniously and intentionally kills another
from taking any of the benefits which would accrue to the killer
because of the death. 08 While very similar to the West Virginia
statute,' 9 there are some minor differences in the Code provision.
West Virginia's law makes conviction of a felonious killing a con-
clusive bar against the killer benefiting as an heir-at-law, by will,
or as an insurance beneficiary. Acquittal on a felony charge, how-
ever, does not mean that the killer will be allowed to benefit from
the death. Where the statutory bar is inapplicable, as in the case
where there is no conviction, or conviction only of a non-felonious
killing, the West Virginia court has held that the rights of the killer
to the deceased's property must be determined in a civil action
applying common law principles.310 The only West Virginia cases
to deal with this problem have been concerned with the rights of a
slayer-beneficiary to insurance proceeds from policies on the life of
the slain insured.3 ' These cases have held that the beneficiary,
when found guilty of intentionally killing the insured, may not
take the policy proceeds. Such decisions appear to rest on the
ground of public policy.
Where insurance is not involved there are three lines of au-
thority: (1) Legal title does not pass to the murderer as heir or
devisee; (2) legal title passes and may be retained by the murderer
regardless of his wrong; (3) legal title passes to the murderer, but
equity will treat him as constructive trustee of the title because of
the unconscionable mode of its acquisition and compel him to
convey title to the heirs of the deceased, exclusive of himself.2 2 It
is highly probable that the West Virginia court would adopt the
last of the three, particularly in light of some rather imprecise
language in the earlier insurance cases to the effect that the court
had already adopted the constructive trust theory.33 Thus, a killer
would receive legal title as the result of an acquittal on the crimi-
nal charge but a court of equity may impose a constructive trust
upon the property if it is found that the accused was guilty of the
wrong.32 4
'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803.
3W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-2 (1966).
3lMetropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934).
3
"E.g., Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S.E. 865
(1919).
3
"Note, Constructive Trusts in West Virginia, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 357, 362 (1939).
3 3State v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 109, 114, 170 S.E. 909, 911
(1933).
3 
'Note, Equity - Inheritance From Ancestor Who Was Killed by Heir, 58 W.
VA. L. Rsv. 197 (1956).
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This is the result that would clearly be reached under the
Uniform Code.31' The Code bar applies not only to heirs and devi-
sees, 311 but also to joint tenants, 317 and beneficiaries of bonds, in-
surance policies, or other contractural arrangements,318 as well as
to anyone else who acquires property or interest as a result of the
killing.3 '
The West Virginia statute refers to heirs, devisees, and insur-
ance beneficiaries specifically and "otherwise" in a general sense
without defining the term. One can assume that, as under the
Uniform Code, this would preclude the acquisition of interest in
any type of property in keeping with the principles of the statute.
Both statutes provide that property under a will or at intestacy
passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent, and the Code
passes joint property as if the killer had no rights of survivorship.
The West Virginia statute also bars the conspirator of a killing
even if the killing did not succeed, while the Uniform Code is silent
on this point. The Code does provide protection for the bona fide
purchaser for value who, without notice, buys property from the
killer before rights under this section are adjudicated,3 20 a provision
not found in the West Virginia statute.
Part 9. Custody and Deposit of Wills.
The Uniform Code provides for the safekeeping of the will
during the testator's lifetime by depositing it with the probate
court,3' a provision not found in the West Virginia statutes. During
the testator's lifetime, only he or his authorized representative are
entitled to possession of the document. In the case of a protected
testator, his conservator may examine the will under court proce-
dures designed to protect the confidential nature of the document
insofar as is possible. This does not prevent, however, the opening
of the will after death to determine the identity of the executor or
other interested parties necessary for notification.3 2
Both statutes place a duty on the custodian of a will to deliver
it upon notice of death to a person able to secure its probate, to
"'UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803(e).
3
"
6Id. § 2-803(a).
31Id. § 2-803(b).
11'Id. § 2-803(c).
"Id. § 2-803(d).
32Id. § 2-803(f).
-'Id. § 2-901.
1mid. § 2-901, Comment.
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the appropriate court, under the Uniform Code,13  or to the clerk
of the county court, under the West Virginia statute2' Both stat-
utes also provide for the recovery of damages sustained as a result
of failure to deliver, and both provide for compelling delivery and
punishing the recalcitrant for failure to deliver. Under the West
Virginia provision the custodian has thirty days after notice of the
testator's death to deliver the will, while the Uniform Code pro-
vides that it be delivered with "reasonable promptness."
Part II of this study will discuss the procedures for concluding
the decedent's affairs and transferring his property to those enti-
tled to it, as well as nonprobate transfers, trust administration,
and due protection of a person under a disability.
-Id. § 2-902.
324W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1 (1966).
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APPENDIX
COMPARISON OF WEST VIRGINIA AND UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE PATTERNS OF INTESTATE
SUCCESSION*
WEST VIRGINIA LAW UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
Case I: Children or Their Lineal Descendant But No Surviving
Spouse.
Both real and personal pro-
perty to children or their
lineal descendants per Same
stirpes.
Case II: Surviving Spouse and Children of the Decedent and Sur-
viving Spouse.
Real Property: All to chil-
dren. Surviving spouse takes
a dower interest of one third
of all real estate deceased
spouse was seized of or
entitled to at any time
during coverture that has
not been lawfully barred
or relinquished.
Personal Property: one-
third of the surviving spouse,
two-thirds of children
equally, lineal descen-
dants per stirpes.
First $50,000 plus one-half
of the balance of the
intestate estate to
surviving spouse. Children
take the remaining one-
half of balance equally.
Case III: Surviving Spouse and Children, One or More of Whom
Are Children of Decedent by a Prior Marriage.
Same as Case II One-half of surviving
spouse, one-half to
decedent's children
equally, lineal
descendants per stirpes.
41
Curry: West Virginia and the Uniform Probate Code: An Overview Part I
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1974
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76
Case IV: Surviving Spouse and Parents But No Children.
All to surviving spouse:
Both real and personal
property.
First $50,000 plus one-half of
balance to the surviving spouse.
Parents take one-half of balance.
If no parents, all to surviving
spouse.
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